\u3cem\u3eVan Oster v. Kansas\u3c/em\u3e and the Unconstitutionality of Civil Forfeiture by Senst, Thomas
Undergraduate Review
Volume 13 Article 21
2017
Van Oster v. Kansas and the Unconstitutionality of
Civil Forfeiture
Thomas Senst
Follow this and additional works at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, and the Law Commons
This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts.
Copyright © 2017 Thomas Senst
Recommended Citation
Senst, Thomas (2017). Van Oster v. Kansas and the Unconstitutionality of Civil Forfeiture. Undergraduate Review, 13, 189-200.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/undergrad_rev/vol13/iss1/21
Bridgewater State University 2017 • The Undergraduate Review  •  189 
Introduction
In the 19th Century, Congress enacted the first civil forfeiture statues in the Navigation Acts of 1817. Congress’ intention was to create legislation that 
could be used to help fight piracy. Civil forfeiture al-
lows law enforcement to seize property allegedly in-
volved in a crime without having to charge the owner. 
Homes, cars, businesses, and more are all subject to 
civil forfeiture. Additionally, many of the forfeited pro-
ceeds are often granted to the agency that successfully 
seized the property; therefore, law enforcement profits 
from crime. In a recent study of 1,400 municipal and 
local law enforcement agencies, 40% have become de-
pendent on asset forfeiture funds to pay for expenses 
(Worral, 2001).
 
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the contradic-
tory nature of civil forfeiture through a case analysis of 
Van Oster v. Kansas and compare the precedent estab-
lished in this case to current civil forfeiture laws. This 
case has not received the proper attention that it de-
serves in civil forfeiture scholarly literature. Van Oster 
represents a case in which the Supreme Court upheld 
civil forfeiture, yet the internal logic of their justifica-
tion suggests that civil forfeiture is unconstitutional. 
Additionally, this paper will conceptualize judicial dic-
tions and opinions delivered by Justice Brandeis and 
Justice Holmes, who both served on the Supreme Court 
in the beginning of the twentieth century, to show that 
they imply civil forfeiture is unconstitutional. 
 
Furthermore, there will be a section discussing the 
new development of the innocent owner defense as 
established under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform 
Act (CAFRA) of 2000. Congress enacted CAFRA to 
alleviate many of the problems existent in civil forfei-
ture, such as some of the problems that will arise in Van 
Oster. To highlight the contemporary relevance of Van 
Oster, this paper will compare it to CAFRA’s mandated 
innocent owner defense. As will become clear in the 
paper, property can be seized despite an owner’s guilt 
or innocence of a crime.
Asset Forfeiture
Asset forfeiture is a legal power that allows law en-
forcement to seize property involved in the facilitation 
of a crime or to seize property that has been used to 
commit a crime (Cassella, 2013). Once the property is 
seized, law enforcement takes ownership of the prop-
erty and can either reserve it or sell it, retaining any 
proceeds. Some of the funds are funneled directly back 
to the forfeiting agency, some funds are channeled into 
victim compensations funds, and others are placed in 
general funds on local, state, or federal levels. There 
are three forms of asset forfeiture: administrative for-
feiture, criminal forfeiture, and civil forfeiture. Each 
variation has its own procedures and place within the 
justice system.
  
When an agency with proper authority establishes 
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probable cause that a piece of property is involved in a 
crime, that agency can place an administrative warrant 
on the property. The agency must then notify any po-
tential claimants of the impending forfeiture. Claimants 
have a certain time to place a claim on the property. 
If no claimant challenges the forfeiture, the property 
is seized. However, should a person make a claim, the 
overseeing agency must either return the property or 
pursue a trial forfeiture1 (Cassella, 2013). The agency 
can also choose to pursue a criminal and civil forfeiture 
concurrently.
 
In a criminal forfeiture, property is seized post-convic-
tion of an offender (Leach & Malcolm, 1994). When an 
offender is indicted, any property the government is in-
terested in seizing must be listed within the indictment. 
Upon conviction, the government forfeits the property 
listed in the indictment (Cassella, 2013). If any property 
is not specifically labeled in the indictment, it cannot be 
seized. Law enforcement used criminal forfeiture ex-
tensively during the 1970s as a tactic to fight organized 
crime. Specifically, law enforcement used it to seize 
drug proceeds. However, this tactic was highly ineffec-
tive. Often, the drug money would be dispersed into 
various bank accounts or altogether disappear by the 
time an offender could be convicted (Williams, 2006).
Where procedural aspects fail in criminal forfeiture, 
civil forfeiture makes up for it, if at a constitutional 
price. Prior to 2000, there was no unifying civil forfei-
ture legislation. Instead, civil forfeiture powers derived 
from subsections of various pieces of legislation. A typ-
ical civil forfeiture case followed an establishment of 
probable cause that a piece of property was involved 
in a crime. Once probable cause was established, a law
enforcement agency had to file for a civil forfeiture 
warrant on the property, at which point, the agency took 
possession of the property (Cassella, 2013).
 
It is important to note that the agency which established 
probable cause does not have to be the same agency 
which placed the civil forfeiture warrant. If a state has 
strict civil forfeiture laws, state or local agencies can 
bypass those laws through adoptive forfeiture. State 
agencies render the case to the federal government 
which then proceeds with the forfeiture (Worral, 2001). 
Known as equitable sharing, the federal government 
receives 20% of the funds from the forfeiture, and the 
state or local agency retains the remaining 80% of the 
forfeited proceeds (Moores, 2009).
 
Once a law enforcement agency has placed a civil 
forfeiture warrant on a piece of property, the proper-
ty is physically seized until a trial takes place (Cassel-
la, 2013). However, law enforcement agencies do not 
have to place a warrant on a piece of property to seize 
it through civil forfeiture. The relation-back doctrine 
is a power attached to civil forfeiture that grants prop-
erty rights to the government once property has been 
involved in a crime (Worral, 2001). Because of the re-
lation-back doctrine, property can be seized after the 
establishment of probable cause.
Following the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 
2000, Congress weakened the relation-back doctrine 
(Leach & Malcolm, 1994). However, the basic prem-
ise of the relation-back doctrine is still largely in effect 
under the category of summary forfeitures. A summa-
ry forfeiture is a seizure of property by law enforce-
ment that takes place on scene without a trial being 
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held (Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008). Typically, summary 
forfeitures are reserved for property that is illegal of 
itself, such as illegal weapons and illicit drugs. Defen-
dants are not allowed to claim ownership to property 
that is illegal to own, which grants power to summary 
forfeitures (Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008). Some forms 
of property that are subject to civil forfeiture are also 
subject to summary forfeiture.
 
Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding opposed to in 
persona (Bourdreaux & Pritchard, 1996). In a civil 
forfeiture trial, a jury determines a piece of property 
guilty or innocent of a crime instead of a person. Prop-
erty is not granted the same rights that defendants are. 
Additionally, civil forfeiture trials take place in civil 
court despite the property’s seizure being in relation to 
a crime. Many constitutional rights and protections do 
not apply in civil forfeiture trials because of their clas-
sification as in rem and because civil forfeiture trials 
take place in civil courts.
A Brief History of Civil Asset Forfeiture Before Van 
Oster v. Kansas (1926)
Civil forfeiture derives from an old English common law 
practice known as deodands (Finklestein, 1973). The 
English Crown heavily abused deodands (Bourdreaux 
& Pritchard, 1996), and after the United States gained 
its independence, the founders created asset forfeiture 
laws that were primarily used to fight piracy. Tracking 
down pirates was difficult during the 1700s and 1800s 
due to technological constraints; therefore, the govern-
ment used asset forfeiture to seize stolen goods when 
the pirate could not be found (Bourdreaux & Pritchard, 
1996).
 
There are three specific civil forfeiture cases that took 
place in the 1800s that are of note. First, in The Palmy-
ra v. United States (1827), the Supreme Court of the 
United States declared that the innocence of an owner 
was not a mitigating factor in a civil forfeiture trial. The 
Palmyra was a ship whose captain engaged in piratical 
aggressions against the United States (The Palmyra v. 
United States, 1827). However, the owner of the ship 
was not on board of the vessel during the piratical act, 
nor was the owner aware of the captain’s intentions to 
commit piracy. Despite the owner’s innocence, the ship 
itself was involved in a crime and was seized regardless 
(The Palmyra v. United States, 1827).
 
The Palmyra had been seized based on archaic supersti-
tions that were used to justify deodands in old English 
common law. Following English deodand law, if an ob-
ject had the ability to move, it had the ability to commit 
a crime (Finklestein, 1973). For instance, if a vase were 
to fall on someone’s head and kill that person, the vase 
would have been guilty of murder and could be for-
feited to the Crown under the presumption that it was 
possessed by Satan (Finklestein, 1973). While these su-
perstitions were not considered by the Supreme Court 
at the time of The Palmyra, it was still believed that if 
an object could move, it could commit a crime (The 
Palmyra v. United States, 1827).
 
Later, in Dobbin’s Distillery v. United States (1877), the 
powers of civil forfeiture expanded from only personal 
property2 to real3 and personal property. Although real 
property was never explicitly labeled as a form of prop-
erty that could be seized through civil forfeiture until 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
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Control Act of 1970 (Moores, 2009), the precedent es-
tablished in this case granted law enforcement the pow-
er to seize real property much earlier. Real property can 
include a person’s house and business and no limita-
tions were placed on this power until Austin v. United 
States (1993), which prevented the government from 
seizing both a person’s home and place of work in rela-
tion to a single, small drug violation.
 
Finally, in Boyd v. United States (1886), the Supreme 
Court declared civil forfeiture to be “quasi-criminal.” 
This precedent created a legal limbo where civil for-
feiture is neither civil or criminal, casting doubt as to 
where civil forfeiture belongs in the justice system. 
Civil forfeiture has two qualities, remedial and punitive 
(Cassella, 2013). The remedial aspect consists of fun-
neling proceeds into law enforcement and victim com-
pensation funds. The punitive fragment derives from 
punishing offenders who abuse their property and de-
terring others from using their property illegally (Jen-
son & Gerber, 1996).
Following these cases, there was an expansion of civil 
forfeiture powers during the 1920s after the passage of 
the National Prohibition Act of 1919. The act allowed 
the government to seize property used in the transpor-
tation, manufacturing, or selling of illicit liquor and al-
cohol. Congress repealed the National Prohibition Act 
with the Twenty-First Amendment. The National Pro-
hibition Act was federal law at the time of Van Oster v. 
Kansas and the precedent established in this case has 
had disturbing consequences for contemporary civil 
forfeiture law.
Legal Analysis of Van Oster v. Kansas (1926)
Van Oster v. Kansas is a widely overlooked civil for-
feiture case. This can be attributed to the time at which 
it was decided. As stated, Van Oster took place during 
Prohibition, a fourteen-year span which outlawed the 
transportation, selling and distribution of alcohol and 
liquor under the National Prohibition Act of 1919 
(Okrent, 2011).
 
Notably, the property forfeited in Van Oster was not 
seized under the National Prohibition Act, rather un-
der a Kansas statute which mimicked federal Prohibi-
tion laws. This statute granted civil forfeiture powers 
to state and local law enforcement agencies. Although 
specific precedent regarding the Kansas statute became 
meaningless after the Twenty-First Amendment, prec-
edent established in this case exemplifies a disturbing 
example of the abuse of civil forfeiture power.
 
The plaintiff in this case, Van Oster, purchased a car 
from a local car dealership. As stipulated in the deal, 
the car was left on retention by the dealership to be 
used for business purposes (Van Oster v Kansas, 1926). 
Prohibition agents arrested an employee of the dealer-
ship, Clyde Brown, for allegedly being involved in a 
bootlegging operation for which Brown used the car to 
transport illegal liquors (Van Oster v. Kansas, 1926). A 
criminal court later acquitted Brown of the crime.
 
Following the acquittal of Brown, Van Oster appealed 
the forfeiture of her car. Of the numerous arguments 
presented by Van Oster, two are of importance. First, 
Van Oster claimed that the Kansas statute denied due 
process guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Second, and most importantly, Van Oster challenged 
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the seizure of her car based on the acquittal of Brown. 
Brown’s acquittal proved no crime occurred, and, there-
fore, the forfeiture of the car was illegal (Van Oster v. 
Kansas, 1926).
 
The Supreme Court of the United States opposed Van 
Oster on both her arguments. The Court declared that 
procedures similar to ones in the Kansas statute regard-
ing civil forfeiture had never been deemed to violate 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and 
therefore could not violate the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Van Oster v Kansas, 1926).
 
Prior to Van Oster v. Kansas, there had been many Fifth 
Amendment claims raised against civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings. In the three cases mentioned earlier in this 
paper, The Palmyra v. United States (1827), Dobbin’s 
Distillery v. United States (1877), and Boyd v. United 
States (1886), plaintiffs raised Fifth Amendment argu-
ments to appeal civil forfeiture. In a typical civil for-
feiture case, law enforcement seizes property before 
a trial takes place. Therefore, owners are deprived of 
their property without proper legal process. In previous 
cases, the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause failed 
as an appellate method because civil forfeiture cases 
are in rem proceedings. The rights of the owner are not 
taken into consideration in a civil forfeiture case.
 
By attempting to employ the Fourteenth Amendment 
to civil forfeiture, Van Oster was attempting a two-step 
assault on the constitutionality of civil forfeiture. First, 
the seizure of her car was under a Kansas state stat-
ute opposed to a federal statute. Before the ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional amend-
ments applied to federal law, not state law. However, 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s inclusion clause applied 
most constitutional amendments to state law. To apply 
the due process clause in the constitution, Van Oster 
first had to establish that the Kansas statute was subject 
to constitutional constraints.
 
Van Oster’s second step of employing the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s due process clause provided a chance 
for the Supreme Court to revisit the meaning of due 
process in relation to civil forfeiture. Again, due pro-
cess precedent established under the Fifth Amendment 
stated that due process does not apply to property, or 
property owners, in a civil forfeiture trial. However, 
there had been no precedent regarding the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s right of due process in relation to a civ-
il forfeiture trial at this point. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment could have acted as a catalyst to overturn nearly a 
century of precedent. Instead, the Supreme Court re-
tained past precedent and stated that due process, even 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, does not act as a mit-
igating factor in a civil forfeiture trial.
 
Van Oster’s second argument, the acquittal of Brown, 
proved no crime occurred. If no crime occurred, then 
there was no purpose for the forfeiture because, in a 
civil forfeiture trial, property is seized based on its re-
lation to a crime. However, Van Oster’s appeal was one 
of certiorari. Therefore, Van Oster had to base her argu-
ment on constitutional rights and restrictions. The Su-
preme Court stated that Van Oster failed to raise a con-
stitutional argument as to why the acquittal of Brown 
showed cause for the reversal of the forfeiture and so 
the car was seized nonetheless. In other words, Van Os-
ter failed to raise proper legal terminology, so her car 
was seized despite Brown’s acquittal.
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Brown’s acquittal and the car’s seizure represents a dis-
connect from the justice system and civil forfeiture. The 
standard of proof is vastly different in a criminal case 
opposed to a civil forfeiture trial. In a criminal trial, an 
offender can only be found guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In a civil forfeiture case, property can be seized 
based on a preponderance of evidence, a lower burden 
of proof (Johnson, 2002).
 
The difference in these two levels of proof are para-
mount. The purpose for the different standards of proof 
derives from the perceptions of criminal court versus 
civil court. Criminal courts are designed to punish of-
fenders whereas civil courts are designed to settle dis-
putes between private parties. Moreover, civil forfeiture 
is not solely a punishment but it is also regarded as re-
medial (Cassella, 2013) (Stillman, 2013) (Bourdreaux 
& Pritchard, 1996). This is exemplified best by the 
“quasi-criminal” ruling of civil forfeiture delivered in 
Boyd v. United States (1886). 
 
In Van Oster’s case, law enforcement was essentially 
pursuing a criminal action and civil action against Van 
Oster’s car at the same time. By pursuing both a crim-
inal action and a civil action concurrently, the govern-
ment attempted to punish or deprive property based off 
one potentially illegal action while using varying stan-
dards of proof. Beyond a reasonable doubt is a more 
difficult level of proof to obtain than a preponderance 
of evidence. Therefore, by using civil forfeiture, the 
government can almost ensure a favorable outcome at 
the end of the case.
 
Not only are the levels of proof between criminal trials 
and civil trials vastly different, civil forfeiture is unique 
in that it is exempt from the exclusionary rule of the 
Fourth Amendment (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). Per the 
exclusionary rule, law enforcement is barred from us-
ing illegally obtained evidence in a trial. Additionally, 
law enforcement agencies are prohibited from using 
evidence gained after the establishment of probable 
cause (Jenson & Gerber, 1996). Civil forfeiture, which 
already has a lower standard of proof than a criminal 
court, can use illegally obtained evidence and post sei-
zure evidence to establish probable cause.
 
Not to mention, in a civil forfeiture trial, the 
government does not have to prove that a crime hap-
pened, evidenced by Van Oster’s precedent. To prove 
something beyond a reasonable doubt is the closest 
form of proof that a jury can confirm as to whether a 
crime occurred and whether a defendant is guilty. The 
acquittal of Brown casts doubt as to whether the crime 
occurred, and if the crime did occur, it casts doubt if 
Brown or the car was involved. If no crime occurred, 
or if the car was not involved in the crime, the forfei-
ture of the car is illegal. Consequently, by employing 
a lower standard of evidence in a civil forfeiture trial, 
the government is then able to seize property even if no 
crime was legally defined to have transpired. Precedent 
established in Van Oster grants the government power 
to seize property illegally when no crime has been de-
fined to have occurred.
Discussion
Using the precedent established in Van Oster, this sec-
tion of the paper seeks to illustrate the unconstitutional-
ity of civil forfeiture. Specifically, it will draw upon the 
earlier information established in this paper including 
an understanding of asset forfeiture, the three early cas-
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es of civil forfeiture during the 1800s, and the precedent 
of Van Oster. Furthermore, this section will conceptual-
ize and analyze statements from Justice Oliver Holmes 
and Justice Louis Brandeis, both of whom served on 
the Supreme Court of the United States during the early 
twentieth century. Although the Supreme Court upheld 
Van Oster, the logic presented by the court and by these 
justices suggests that Van Oster should have been over-
turned.
 
Civil forfeiture has a dual nature; it is concurrently re-
medial and punitive. Its remedial aspect derives from 
the allocation of proceeds to law enforcement and vic-
tim compensation funds to help prevent, fight, and cope 
with future crime. Civil forfeiture is punitive because 
it is designed to punish owners who use their proper-
ty illegally, deter potential criminals from using their 
property illegally, and prevent criminals from profiting 
from crime (Cassella, 2013) (Jenson & Gerber, 1996).
 
In a decision delivered by the Supreme Court in One 
Ford Coupe v. United States (1926), the Supreme Court 
of the United States acknowledged that should some-
thing be deemed solely a punishment, it must be viewed 
as such under the law (One Ford Coupe v United States, 
1926). As an owner of property in a civil forfeiture case, 
there is no other possibility than punishment. In a civil 
forfeiture trial, if the property is found guilty, the own-
er is punished through the deprivation of their proper-
ty. There is no chance for remedy for an owner. If the 
owner can only be punished, then in all asset forfeiture 
cases, the legal actor—which is the government—is al-
ways punishing the owner.
 
Punishment through civil forfeiture is unconstitutional. 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver  Wendell Holmes stated 
“statutes…are unconstitutional…[if] they punish the 
plaintiff with heavy fines and penalties…without defin-
ing the crime…of which he is guilty and without pro-
viding any criminal procedure or right guaranteed him 
by the Constitution of the United States…” (Holmes 
Paper Section 4 Sequence 17). Per Holmes’ criteria, 
civil forfeiture punishes owners unconstitutionally.
First, civil forfeiture punishes owners without defining 
a crime for which they are guilty, as evidenced by the 
precedent established in Van Oster. Van Oster was pun-
ished through the deprivation of her property despite 
Brown’s acquittal. Second, civil forfeiture punishes 
owners without providing proper criminal procedure. 
Civil forfeiture trials take place in civil court as op-
posed to criminal court. Correspondingly, the guilt and 
innocence of the owner does not act as a mitigating or 
aggravating factor in a civil forfeiture trial because the 
property is on trial, not the owner. Third, civil forfeiture 
punishes owners without providing proper constitu-
tional protections, illustrated by the lack of due process 
rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Therefore, per Justice Holmes’ requirements, 
civil forfeiture punishes owners unconstitutionally.
 
This aligns with what Justice Brandeis stated in another 
case: “courts of justice will not redress a wrong done 
by the defendant when he who seeks redress comes 
into court with unclean hands” (Brandeis Papers Reel 
36 Frame 00590). Brandeis conveyed that if a person 
wished to receive compensation for a wrong in court, 
that person will not be compensated if that person has 
committed a wrong as well. Brandeis later stated the 
application of this rule is more persuasive if the ille-
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gal actor is the government (Brandeis Papers Reel 36 
Frame 00590).
 
In a civil forfeiture case, the government is compensat-
ed for a wrong, or a crime. Compensation is in the form 
of forfeitable assets. Again, per Holmes’ constitutional-
ity requirement, this compensation is obtained through 
unconstitutional means. In effect, the government 
is compensated for a wrong while also committing a 
wrong. Following Brandeis, this should not be allowed 
by the courts. Again, to Brandeis, this becomes more 
persuasive when the illegal actor is the government. In 
all civil forfeiture cases, the legal actor is always the 
government, so if civil forfeiture is unconstitutional, 
the government is then always acting illegally when 
employing civil forfeiture.
 
Civil forfeiture is unconstitutional. It violates multiple 
Amendments, punishes owners without proper due pro-
cess, and compensates the government for crime, caus-
ing the government to form a symbiotic relationship 
with crime. Contrarily, civil forfeiture cannot simply be 
removed from a practical standpoint. As stated before, 
many civil forfeiture proceeds are dispersed into law 
enforcement funds. During a study of 1,400 municipal 
and local police departments, 40% were found to be 
reliant on civil forfeiture funds (Worral, 2001). To re-
move civil forfeiture would be to act irresponsibly and 
deprive these departments of the funds they need.
 
Equally important, civil forfeiture prevents criminals 
from profiting from crime. Although other forms of 
asset forfeiture also serve this purpose, none do so as 
effectively as civil forfeiture. In an administrative for-
feiture case, once a claimant has challenged the forfei-
ture, the forfeiture must proceed to a trial forfeiture—
either a criminal forfeiture or a civil forfeiture. During 
the 1970s, law enforcement attempted to employ crim-
inal forfeiture to cripple organized crime by targeting 
drug proceeds. By the time a criminal trial was over, 
the money would be dispersed and was largely unob-
tainable.
 
Boyd v. United States’ ruling of civil forfeiture as be-
ing “quasi-criminal” is the best definition of civil for-
feiture. It is designed to punish, but it does so without 
following criminal procedure. Civil forfeiture has be-
come so ingrained in the criminal justice system as a 
remedial tool, that to completely remove it would be 
irresponsible without a plan to subsidize it. The next 
section of the paper will discuss possible asset forfei-
ture solutions to civil forfeiture and if these solutions 
would have changed the outcome of Van Oster.
CAFRA’s Innocent Owner Defense: A Proper Solu-
tion to Van Oster?
This section of the paper will analyze contemporary 
civil forfeiture law in the context of Van Oster. Specif-
ically, it will determine if the precedent established in 
Van Oster could exist under CAFRA’s innocent owner 
defense. Despite the large time gap between Van Oster 
and CAFRA, it is imperative to analyze both together 
as Congress designed CAFRA to alleviate the internal 
inconstancies of civil forfeiture and prevent precedent 
similar to Van Oster from recurring. 
 
As stated earlier in this paper, the guilt or innocence of 
an owner does not act as a mitigating or aggravating 
factor in a civil forfeiture trial. Fortunately, after 2000, 
CAFRA enacted an innocent owner defense. However, 
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there are limits to this defense. The innocent owner de-
fense is not constitutionally protected (Johnson, 2002). 
Lacking a constitutional backbone, the innocent owner 
defense has been interpreted differently in various state 
and federal circuits.
 
One definition of the innocent owner defense is as fol-
lows: should the conveyance of property be unlawful 
and should the property be used unknowingly to com-
mit an illegal action, then the owner can be considered 
innocent (Johnson, 2002). The variables of conveyance 
and knowledge of the illegal act have been critical in 
formulating a working definition of the innocent owner 
defense. Some courts require that both the property be 
conveyed illegally and for the owner to be ignorant of 
the illegal use of his or her property for the innocent 
owner defense to work. Other courts require only one 
factor to be satisfied, and others still have more compli-
cated definitions of when to employ the innocent owner 
defense.
 
To satisfy part of the innocent owner defense, the own-
er must be ignorant of the illegal usage of their prop-
erty. It is important to note that not all courts treat this 
defense similarly. Some courts place more emphasis on 
the ignorance of the illegal usage than the illegal con-
veyance of property. However, many courts state that 
owners must be ignorant of their property being used 
illegally to ensure that the illegal usage of property was 
against the consent of the owner (Johnson, 2002). Asset 
forfeiture exists in part to punish owners who use their 
property illegally, so where the illegal usage of property 
is aligned with the consent of the owner, asset forfeiture 
is designed to punish that owner.
 
There is a third factor of the innocent owner defense 
which is whether the owner did all that was within rea-
son to prevent the illegal usage of their property (John-
son, 2002). In some courts, this requirement is satisfied 
by an establishment of illegal conveyance of property 
or ignorance of an illegal action. If an owner has their 
property stolen, the owner can no longer enforce their 
will over the property. Additionally, if the owner is ig-
norant of potential wrongdoing, the owner may not rea-
sonably be able to prevent the illegal usage.
 
Although this third factor is sometimes satisfied by an 
establishment of the first two factors, it can also be in-
dependent (Johnson, 2002). For example, if a person’s 
car is stolen and is used to rob a bank, but the owner 
did not call the police to report a stolen vehicle, the rea-
sonable action requirement may not be satisfied. In this 
case, the owner would have had to report the car stolen 
to law enforcement to fulfill the third requirement of 
the innocent owner defense. Similarly, if an owner of a 
car knows their car will be used to rob a bank and does 
not attempt to prevent the robbery, or alert authorities, 
this third requirement will not be satisfied.
 
The innocent owner defense is enforced differently by 
a state and circuit basis. Because there is no universal 
consensus on the innocent owner defense, it is import-
ant to analyze it under various conditions. First is a le-
nient viewpoint of the innocent owner defense, where 
if any one of the factors is satisfied, it will be enough 
to invoke the innocent owner defense. Second will be 
a moderate viewpoint where two of the factors must 
be satisfied. Lastly, will be a strict viewpoint where all 
three factors must be satisfied. For the sake of argument, 
it will be assumed that Brown did commit a crime.
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First, Van Oster was ignorant of the intentions of 
Brown. Although the car was left on retention by the 
dealership, Van Oster was unaware exactly how Brown 
would use the car, and was unaware that the car would 
be used illegally. Therefore, Van Oster was ignorant of 
the illegal usage of her car and under the lenient defini-
tion, the innocent owner defense would have prevented 
Van Oster from losing her car.
 
Whether Van Oster did all that she could to prevent the 
illegal usage of her car depends on the definition of 
reasonable. Again, as a second factor, the owner must 
prove that she did everything reasonable to prevent the 
illegal usage of her car. If Van Oster was truly ignorant, 
there is not much she could have done to prevent the 
illegal usage of her car. However, it could be argued 
that Van Oster had a duty to constantly question the ac-
tions of Brown to ensure the car was not being used 
illegally as it was known that Brown would be using 
the car regularly. Therefore, depending on the defini-
tion of reasonable, Van Oster could have, or could not 
have employed the innocent owner defense under the 
moderate viewpoint.
 
Following the final factor, the conveyance of Van Os-
ter’s car was completely legal. Van Oster knew that 
Brown would be using her car. Under the strict defini-
tion of the innocent owner defense, Van Oster could not 
have employed the innocent owner defense.
Conclusion
Precedent established in Van Oster represents a funda-
mental disconnect between the legal spirit of the Con-
stitutional and its application. It is clear to see why an 
innocent owner should not be deprived of property, 
especially when no crime has occurred. Unfortunately, 
the precedent still exists, even with the adoption of an 
innocent owner defense. Although civil forfeiture does 
not match up with the spiritual intent of the Constitu-
tion, it cannot be easily repealed or replaced because 
of law enforcement’s dependency on it as a source of 
revenue and justice.
 
To replace civil forfeiture with either administrative 
forfeiture or criminal forfeiture would be irresponsible. 
Both procedures would be unable to satisfy the void left 
behind by the removal of civil forfeiture. However, to 
leave civil forfeiture intact without reform would be to 
rob innocent owners of their property.
 
The most comprehensive attempt at civil asset forfei-
ture reform under CAFRA was not enough to prevent 
abuses by law enforcement. Issues intrinsic in civil 
forfeiture do not stem purely from procedural or con-
stitutional inconsistencies, but also from larger social 
and political contexts. There was a large spike of civil 
forfeiture usage following the War on Drugs which not 
only created many new drug related crimes, but also 
restricted police funding. It is not the fault of police de-
partments that abuse civil forfeiture, but the larger so-
cial issue of over criminalization and underfunding. To 
solve the civil forfeiture debate, civil forfeiture must be 
conceptualized as a symptom of a much larger illness.
Notes
1. Trial Forfeiture – is either a civil forfeiture or a 
criminal forfeiture. An administrative forfeiture is not a 
trial forfeiture because no trial takes place when or after 
the property is seized.
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2.  Personal Property – A form of property that can 
be easily moved. Typically, it refers to smaller items but 
can include cars or ships, as in the case of The Palmyra.
3. Real Property – Property that cannot be easily 
moved: it is usually something tethered to the land or 
the land itself.
References
Bourdreaux, D., & Pritchard, A. (1996). 
Boyd v. United States (The Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States 1886).
Brandeis, L. (1926). Brandeis Papers. Louis Brandies 
Papers. Boston, Massachusetts, United States of Amer-
ica: Harvard Law Library.
Cassella, S. (2013). Asset Forfeiture Law in the United 
States. Huntington: Juris Publishing Inc.
Finklestein, J. (1973). The Goring Ox: Some Histor-
ical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful 
Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty. Temple 
Law Quarterly, 168-290.
Holmes, O. (1926). Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Papers. 
Series IV Judicial Papers, 1887-1920. Boston, Massa-
chusetts, United States of America: Harvard Law 
Library.
Jenson, E. L., & Gerber, J. (1996). The Civil Forfeiture 
of Assets and the War on Drugs: Expanding Criminal 
Sanctions While Reducing Due Process Protections. 
Crime and Delinquency, 421-434.
Johnson, B. T. (2002). Reforming Civility - The Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Baby Steps To-
ward a More Civilized Civil Forfeiture System. Indiana 
Law Review, 1045-1084.
Leach, A. W., & Malcolm, J. G. (1994). Criminal For-
feiture: An Appropriate to the Civil Forfeiture Debate. 
Georgia State University Law Review, 241-295.
Moores, E. (2009). Reforming the Civil Asset Forfei-
ture Reform Act. Arizona Law Review, 777-803.
Okrent, D. (2011). Last Call. New York: Scribner.
One Ford Coupe v. United States, 272 US 321 (The Su-
preme Court November 22, 1926).
Stillman, S. (2013, August 12). The Use and Abuse of 
Civil Forfeiture. The New Yorker.
The Palmyra v. United States, 25 US 1 (The Supreme 
Court of the United States January 1827).
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 US 465 (The Supreme Court 
of the United States November 22, 1926).
Williams, L. (2006). A License to Steal. Chapel Hill: 
North Carolina Press.
Worral, J. L. (2001). Addicted to the Drug War: The 
Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Budgetary Necessity 
in Contemporary Law Enforcement. Journal of Crimi-
nal Justice, 171-187.
Bridgewater State University200  • The Undergraduate Review • 2017    
About the Author
Thomas Senst is a graduating senior majoring in Crim-
inal Justice. He began this research project in a direct-
ed study with Dr. Jamie Huff (Criminal Justice) in the 
spring of 2016. He continued his research after being 
awarded the Adrian Tinsley Summer Research Grant, 
and presented it at the 2016 Midwestern Criminal Jus-
tice Association annual meeting in Chicago. Thomas 
continued this project as an Honors Thesis.
